David A. Greene

Published Writing - Fall 2008

Hazardous Material Incidents: Would you like to phone a friend?

Hazardous materials incidents are by far the most dynamic events that challenge today’s modern fire service.  One of the first items covered in the many hazardous materials technician courses is that “No one fire department can effectively handle a major hazardous materials incident.”  This applies to virtually every fire department in the country and certainly almost all departments in our region. 

Every time you turn on the news, you see another story of how South Carolina is 48^th in Education or Top 10 in violent crime per capita on Wednesdays during odd days of even months, and so on.  One area where South Carolina is even with or ahead of the rest of the country is the pooling of resources.  The S.C. Firefighter Mobilization Committee and its staff allow for a relatively rapid deployment of needed resources anywhere in the state, region or country.  This is a benefit to incident commanders who instead of having to call needed resources individually when they get hit with that bad (pop rivet) haz mat call, can simply push the panic button with one phone call.  From there, your friends from all over the state will spring into action.  The coordination at the state level allows for no one department to be overwhelmed by a request and maintains adequate coverage for the areas that send resources.  Many states do not have this luxury.  There are still fire departments in other parts of the country that are trying to budget money to put up large walls with razor wire around their jurisdictions so that the neighboring departments cannot enter.  Thankfully, South Carolina Fire Departments rely on each other during those overwhelming times and requesting resources from another jurisdiction doesn’t require an act of Congress, passports, or wire cutters.  Other states in the region may have similar such plans or operations to deploy large numbers of resources through a centralized point.

There is an acronym that is taught in the Haz Mat Technician course that should be used to size-up any haz mat release to which you respond and can help produce good outcomes through visualizing future events.  The acronym is MOTEL, Magnitude, Occurrence, Timing, Effects and Location. 

Magnitude.  We want to keep the incident small in scope.  Incidents that start small and end large are very painful.  Think of your average haz mat spill.  Five gallons of gasoline is spilled at the gas station.  No big deal, right?  What happens when the next guy that arrives at the pump to fuel up snuffs his cigarette out on the ground?  Now we have a fire, two exposures, his vehicle and the gas pumps.  Now . . .the guy runs into the store to get help and upon returning finds the back of his SUV involved.  Okay, that’s bad, but wait a minute, his son!  His son is strapped into a car seat in the back seat.  Now we’re having a really bad day.  All of this could have been avoided by initial isolation of the spill.  We want to keep the magnitude of the event small.  Are we going to have big events?  Absolutely, but we want to start big.  We want to pull up to that incident with the panic/phone a friend button in our hands.  Playing catch up with a large incident is agonizing.  We’ll look at this more, later in our case study.

Occurrence.  We want to prevent future events by changing current events.  That 250 gallons per minute we have flowing on the side of that container may solve our thermal problem, but what does it bring with it?  Is the water we are using now contaminated?  If so, where is it going?  We need to plan to control the runoff so that it doesn’t enter the sewers or streams which will cause us major problems later with explosive air concentrations in sewers, corrosive liquids in waterways, etc.  Planning runoff control measures will avoid that unpleasant future event and will prevent our incident from becoming progressively worse.

Timing. What is the timing of our event, how long has it lasted?  This will no doubt determine how long it will last.  If someone ran both forks of a forklift into the bottom of a plastic 55-gallon drum, how much of the product will be left in the container once our entry team reaches the site of the spill?  Keep in mind that the guy driving the forklift had to recognize that he made an oops, he had to notify us (or someone to notify us, but probably only after he tried to cover up his oops), and then we have to have our dispatcher process the call, alert us, we have to respond, set up command, pre-entry medical monitoring, incident action and site safety plan, decon setup, suit and air monitoring equipment selection.  By the time all of that is completed, very little of the product probably remains in its container.  So the question is now, where did the product go?  Did it enter the ground or maybe drainage systems within the facility?  If so, the drum is the least of our problems.  By keeping the timing of our incident in the front of our minds from alarm to termination, we can help to control the timing of future events.

Effects.  What are the effects of our release?  This has less to do with the physical effects we experience if exposed to the product and more to do with the number of ways this product will make the incident miserable for us.  Is the product a solid (easiest to control), a liquid (we want to keep out of sewers and waterways), or does it readily vaporize where the winds can have it affect a lot of people.  If we have five gallons of gasoline spilled at the gas station, the effects are not numerous.  However, the overturned tractor-trailer transporting anhydrous ammonia in downtown Columbia at 12:00 PM on a weekday probably stands to affect a lot of people very quickly, and could very quickly overwhelm the department’s resources and personnel.  If we use a water fog for vapor dispersion with that anhydrous ammonia cloud, think of the effects of our contaminated runoff.  So, we have to think about not just the effects of the product alone, but what are the effects of the product with the material the road is made of, other products that may be present, other products’ packing materials, as well as the effects of what we’re doing to mitigate the hazard.

Location.  Can we change where the next event occurs?  This may be a viable option if we are dealing with an intact container.  Can we move that container somewhere safer?  Clean-up contractors for rail companies frequently move damaged or derailed cars to other areas in order to open up vital areas of track.  Consider dealing with an organic peroxide that has already reached its self-accelerating decomposition temperature (SADT).  This one is a loser.  Once organic peroxides reach their SADT, they are going to explode.  Whether it takes minutes, hours or days will depend on the product, capacity of the container and amount of product loaded.  If faced with that situation, moving the container to an isolated area may be our only viable option.  On August 17, 1974 a tractor-trailer parked in storage in downtown Los Angeles loaded with Methyl Ethyl Ketone Peroxide exploded.  The explosion leveled an entire city block and was felt as far away as 20 miles.  Is the location of our event that one stretch of railway that traverses the area of our jurisdiction that is unpopulated or has the event happened right in front of the elementary school, next to the hospital, next to the long-term health care facility?  We don’t get to choose the locations of our emergencies very often, but if we’re unhappy with the location of current events we have to think of moving the next event.

Our case study comes from the United States Fire Administration Technical Report Series.  It involves a liquefied chlorine release in Henderson, Nevada in May of 1991.  The bulk chlorine storage facility complex was built in an uninhabited area about 10 miles southeast of Las Vegas.  Anyone who has been to Vegas lately knows that the city is building out in all directions faster than the wood and nails can be delivered, which means the plant is not far from people today.  A chlorine leak was detected at 0110 hours by automatic monitoring equipment.  Employees responded and found a pinhole size leak in a 2” elbow about 10 feet above the ground.  The leak was considered minor.  Plant personnel who were considered proficient in chlorine operations simply shut down the pump and closed the discharge valve to stop the flow from the storage tanks to the leaking pipe.  It was calculated that no more that 1,000 lbs. of chlorine would be released once the discharge valve was closed.  Given the relatively small amount, plant personnel chose not to enter the site of the leak until the residual gas had leaked out and dissipated.  At 0150 hours, a citizen passing on a major highway notified 9-1-1 of an offensive odor near the complex.  Reports such as these were frequent from people driving by the complex.  The responsible Battalion Chief decided to wait for a more positive report before responding.  The communications center began calling the complex to see if there were any problems.  At 0200, a second call was received, and a full first alarm was dispatched along with the Haz Mat team.  On arrival at approximately 0215 (65 minutes from leak detection), first in units found plant personnel in need of medical attention and staged at the entrance to the complex.  Employees reported they were in the process of isolating the leak.  Within a few minutes the chlorine cloud enveloped the atmosphere at the complex entrance and most of the plant employees donned their escape respirators.  The I.C. and other members were overcome and additional assistance was requested.  Several plant employees and members of the fire department were treated and transported to hospitals.  Many more resources responded to the scene.  At 0330, conditions began to deteriorate rapidly.  Although the command post was uphill from the plant, unusual wind conditions allowed the gas cloud to move along the ground and envelope the command post, which had to be evacuated.  The command post was first relocated to a convenience store parking lot, which also became untenable and then relocated to a racetrack parking lot several miles away.  At 0345, the County Manager declared a state of emergency and the EOC was activated.  Evacuations of the residential areas and downtown portions of Henderson began.  An estimated 2,400 residents were evacuated from local homes and businesses by firefighters equipped with SCBA’s driving buses from the Clark County School District.  Patients at St. Rose Dominican Hospital were sheltered in place and a retirement home downwind from the leak was evacuated.  The sun rose on several square miles of Nevada covered with a greenish blanket just above ground level.  The amount that had already leaked was now estimated at 100 tons or more.  A reconnaissance team found that the mildly corrosive chlorine disintegrated a seal in a flange behind where the discharge valve that had been closed was located.  As a result, chlorine from the tank had continued to flow throughout the night from the tank (supply) side of the discharge valve that was closed by plant personnel.  A blank flange was inserted after multiple attempts and stopped the leak at 0730 hours.  By 1000, the cloud had dispersed by rising hot air from the ground and winds.  Many were concerned that the Chlorine’s mixture with Water (Hydrochloric & Hypochlorous Acid) could be eating its way out of additional tanks and piping.  The Fire Department remained on scene for several days monitoring other areas of the plant          

So let’s examine our acronym MOTEL on this event. 

Magnitude.  This was initially thought to be a small leak by plant personnel.  What would you think on the 15-minute ride to the scene?  Who called this in?  A passerby.  Well if it was really bad, one of the plant people would be calling, right?  Seeing injured plant personnel on arrival would surely knock our magnitude meter up a couple of notches.  Having to relocate the command post twice would knock it up even further.  Remember we want to keep the magnitude small, but we always want to recognize large incidents and take measures so they don’t become larger. 

Occurrence.  The failure of the plant personnel to recognize the continued flow of chlorine after closing the discharge valve led to continued release of the product.  A faster recognition and mitigation could have prevented such a large-scale release.  By the time fire department resources arrived, they were faced with an uphill battle due to the delay in notification and the amount of product that had been released. 

Timing.  As we previously identified, the first unit arrived 65 minutes after the automatic detection of the leak.  Plant personnel could have dramatically reduced this delay with an earlier notification to the fire department.

Effects.  The tank supplying the leaking pipe had a capacity of 150 tons.  Once the vapor cloud began to affect the residents in Henderson, the command staff determined that an entry team would be needed to patch the leaking pipe and flange in order to reduce the amount of product being released.  Prior to this mitigation step (an offensive tactic), the effects of the leak were widespread.  What were the effects of the sun?  Once the sun rose, the size of the cloud was clearly visible and the magnitude of the problem could be fully appreciated.  But the sun also began heating the earth’s crust causing heat to rise from the ground and gave buoyancy to the Chlorine cloud.  This helped lift the cloud where the wind could better move it away from the populated area.

Location.  The complex was not as far from populated areas as when it was first built.  Relocating the problem away from the people was not feasible so the people had to be moved away from the problem.  Once the command staff realized the magnitude of the leak, quick and effective steps were taken to evacuate those in danger.  The command staff handled the situation well given the multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency incident; however, I’m sure they found that the old adage, “What happens in Vegas, Stays in Vegas” does not apply to chlorine leaks.

This complex had the capability to store up to 1,200 tons of Chlorine at any given time.  The fact that they have their own emergency response team is a benefit for the facility but in this case, it actually hindered the fire department due to a delay in response.  How many of us are put at a disadvantage due to on-site emergency response teams.  When properly trained and willing to work with us, these teams function well.  However, the on-site emergency response team that only calls 9-1-1 once every extinguisher in the plant has been used and the fire is still burning or half of the team is unconscious by the leaking tank puts us way behind the curve before we even arrive. The USFA also identified good use of evacuation techniques, communications, and a coordinated incident command structure between the two fire departments and various local, state, federal and military players operating at the scene.

If this same incident occurs in your jurisdiction today, remember that no fire department can handle a major hazardous materials incident alone.  Although we all hope not to be delayed in our responses, remember to not be complacent with our smells and bells.  Once you have identified that you have a major incident, don’t be afraid to push the panic/phone a friend button.  If you call for a lot of resources and only end up needing a few of them, the rest have only lost diesel fuel.  Remember, by the time you realize the need for additional resources, it is often too late.  Given that the worse the call is, the more of us that want to respond, don’t hesitate to phone a friend when your department finds itself feeling alone and totally overwhelmed by an incident.

Be safe and do good.